Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope With Terrorism by Dr. Andreas M. Bock, Ph.D.
Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 2
Number 1 February 2009
Article 2
Containment Revived: An Alternative
Way to Cope With Terrorism
Dr. Andreas M. Bock, Ph.D.
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich & Munich University of the Federal Armed Forces
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons
pp. 25-38
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the USF Libraries at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bock, Ph.D., Dr. Andreas M.. "Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope With Terrorism." Journal of Strategic
Security 2, no. 1 (2009): 25-38.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss1/2Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope With Terrorism
Abstract
"Coercion or negative sanctions are found to have little effect [on terrorism] and, in important
instances, are even counterproductive." In other words: fighting terrorism by war is no use, it does not
even have a deterrent effect. On the contrary, the employment of massive military power makes it
easier for terrorists to justify their attacks, to find broad support, and to recruit new followers. This
notwithstanding, I will offer an alternative way to cope with terrorism, using George F. Kennan's
concept of containment. This is the link to our effort to effectively fight the terrorist threat: it is a
battle too for the loyalties and convictions of people. Usama bin Ladin is not the problem; given the
growing threat perception of an Islamic motivated international terrorism, he is just a complication.
The problem is a growing willingness to engage in terrorist attacks—even by apparently well
integrated and secularly educated immigrants' children of the second generation. The convictions of
people constitute the strength of a social movement. And besides its horrific violent aspects, terrorism
is a social movement intended to achieve social or political change. Without broad support, terrorism
loses its potential.
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Containment Revived: An Alternative 
Way to Cope With Terrorism
Dr. Andreas M. Bock, Ph.D.
"Coercion or negative sanctions are found to have little effect [on terror-
ism] and, in important instances, are even counterproductive."1 That is 
something we could have learned from current history as well as everyday 
experience: from the French answer to the FLN in Algeria, or the South 
African response to the anti-apartheid movement;2 from the spiral of vio-
lence we experience in Israel, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, and of 
course from the attacks on American and European cities. It is as simple 
as Archbishop Desmond Tutu puts it: "Retaliation against a suicide 
bomber only gives rise to more suicide bombers."3 In other words: fight-
ing terrorism by war is no use, it does not even have a deterrent effect. On 
the contrary, the employment of massive military power makes it easier 
for terrorists to justify their attacks, to find broad support, and to recruit 
new followers.
This notwithstanding, I will offer an alternative way to cope with terror-
ism, using George F. Kennan's concept4 of containment.5 I believe that 
Kennan detected the essence of the threat that Soviet communism posed 
to the U.S. and to Europe after the Second World War: "It is the shadows 
[…] that move the hearts."6 By this he meant that not the Russian military 
capabilities and their alleged intention to go to war whatever the cost 
posed an eminent and threat to the free world, but the possibility of a con-
version of the young post-war governments to (Soviet) communism. 
Kennan was one of the first to realize that in the aftermath of the Second 
World War the U.S. and USSR fought a battle for "the loyalties and con-
victions of hundreds of millions of people."7 The aim of his containment 
strategy was not to block Soviet communism by military force but by psy-
chology: to reawaken the self-confidence of the European peoples.8 And 
the major means to do so was the Marshall Plan: targeting the economic 
reconstruction of Europe and Russia,9 not the military rearmament of a 
potential ally, i.e. the European states, against the USSR.10
This is the link to our effort to effectively fight the terrorist threat: it is a 
battle too for the loyalties and convictions of people. Usama bin Ladin is 
not the problem; given the growing threat perception of an Islamic moti-
vated international terrorism, he is just a complication. The problem is a 
growing willingness to engage in terrorist attacks—even by apparently 
well integrated and secularly educated immigrants' children of the second 
generation, as Olivier Roy puts it:
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Britain has been astonished to discover that the terrorists respon-
sible for the London bombings on 7 July were British citizens, 
born there and apparently well integrated. One was even a con-
vert to Islam. Yet that fits the profile of most of the second gener-
ation of al-Qa’ida terrorists that emerged at the end of the 1990s. 
Most of those active internationally have a westernised back-
ground; they were born in Europe or moved there to study or 
work. All had a secular upbringing. None were educated in 
madrassas (religious schools), except for brief periods in the case 
of the 7 July suicide bombers. In fact they went to ordinary state 
schools and pursued modern studies. Moreover almost all of 
them became born-again Muslims in the West.11
The convictions of people constitute the strength of a social movement. 
And besides its horrific violent aspects, terrorism is a social movement 
intended to achieve social or political change. Without broad support, ter-
rorism loses its potential.
Terrorism's Weakness: Dependence on Support
Basically, terrorism is political and anti-statist in its nature.12 This 
description entails an explanation why terrorism obviously always means 
the use or at least threat of horrible violence.13 Terrorism is a strategy of 
"relatively weak groups,"14 which for different reasons (seemingly or 
effectively) lack the possibility to reach their aims by other means. Terror-
ist groups are based on radical ideas or ideologies that question the estab-
lished social order. Their claims are by definition inconsistent with the 
social systems they are arrayed against. The claim of ending the apartheid 
in South Africa was absolutely inconsistent with the existence of the South 
African apartheid system as such; the aim of transforming the German 
economic-political system into a communist one is absolutely inconsis-
tent with the German Grundgesetz that codifies the German political 
basic order as free and democratic, and the economic order as a market, 
i.e. capitalist economy. The desire—legitimate (like in the case of ANC) or 
not—to implement the particular sociopolitical convictions,15 even if there 
is no legal or regular possibility to do so, is one of the reasons for the 
emergence of terrorism. Whether these terrorist organizations become an 
eminent threat to a society or a social order depends on the dimension of 
support the organization can win.
In order to reach a political aim, public support is required (no matter if it 
is voluntary or enforced). That is why terrorist attacks need to draw great 
attention and move the people within the political system, against which 
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they turn, to really support their aim. By means of terror, people (mem-
bers of a government or eligible voters)16 are to be forced to behave in a 
certain way, to make certain decisions. And the more terrible the attack, 
the more devastating the violence, the greater the public attention and the 
greater the change for the terrorist organization to reach its desired (pub-
lic) effect: "Do X (for example: change your policy concerning country Y), 
otherwise we won't stop the attacks against your Zs (for example: citi-
zens)!"17 Therefore terroristic violence always appears to be indiscrimi-
nate violence. It is "directed at persons who are threatened not on their 
own accounts, but with a view to influencing further persons, in particular 
those with power, official or otherwise, to affect the political arrange-
ments."18 This is a "communication strategy:"19 violence is not an end in 
itself, but "a kind of a signal, to communicate something to a multitude of 
men."20
The bigger the support an organization enjoys, the bigger its capability to 
threaten a society. Of major importance here is that terrorist groups 
depend on broad support—sympathy, money, or volunteers, sometimes 
from sympathizing states, that too provide money, weapons, and training 
facilities and safe havens and give the claims of the terrorist group a voice 
on the international stage it otherwise lacks.
Terrorist groups have to operate "underground," given that non-state vio-
lence is prima facie illegitimate violence.21 Activities planned in and car-
ried out underground are demanding: they need and consume a lot of rare 
resources, like time, money, goods and manpower; and most of all, they 
are dangerous. These activities are constantly in danger of being discov-
ered—and therefore disrupted. Therefore, as an underground organiza-
tion, terrorist groups are in a situation of permanent scarcity, but have no 
secured and reliable access to the resources they need; they cannot, for 
example, advertise for the "job" of an assassin or a bomb engineer, estab-
lish regular trade relations to gather weapons and technology they need, 
or withdraw into a safe area.22 All of this—and here we have come full cir-
cle—depends heavily on supporters (people and states) that provide it.
A prime example for the crucial dependency of terrorism on broad sup-
port is the so-called "German Autumn" caused by the Red Army Faction 
(RAF) in 1977.23 The RAF perceived itself as a social revolutionary organi-
zation that aimed to change firstly the political economical order in West 
Germany and secondly in Western Europe to a communist social order. 
The means the RAF used were terror, kidnapping and arbitrary killing of 
officials of the political-economic establishment and bombings against 
German society. Even if the RAF regarded the officials of the system as 
potential and, from their point of view, legitimate targets, the organiza-
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tion carefully paid attention not to harm any member of the proletariat.24 
As some workers were injured by a series of bomb attacks on the Axel 
Springer publishing house, the RAF not only blamed the capital, i.e. the 
associates of the publishing house for not clearing the building after get-
ting several hints by phone,25 but emphatically apologized for doing so.26 
The reason for this is simple enough: the RAF considered the proletariat 
or the workers in Germany as the audience of its message, i.e. as allies in 
its fight to change the system. The bombings, kidnappings and killings 
were just tactical instruments to provoke the state to exaggerated reac-
tions and, by doing so, to alienate the workers from the state and initiate a 
proletarian rebellion:
That is the dialectic of anti-imperialist combat: that through the 
[…] reaction of the system, the escalation of the counter-revolu-
tion, the transformation of the political state of emergency into a 
military state of emergency, the enemy becomes apparent […] 
and, by the means of its own terror, alienates the crowd, intensi-
fies the antagonism, to necessitate the revolutionary battle.27
The problem was: the RAF received no support from the German workers. 
There were only isolated sympathizers but no broad, no reliable support 
from the middle of the society. Even the fact that the German Democratic 
Republic supported the RAF's self-proclaimed revolutionary fight against 
the "class enemy" in the West28 could not alter the factual insignificance 
of the RAF. But measured by its own aims, to initiate a revolution in 
Germany that would literally set fire to the whole of Western Europe, the 
RAF totally failed. Conversely, German society demonstrated its stability.
Fighting Fire with Fire?
After 9/11 the U.S. declared a "war on terrorism" toppling the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, established special 
interrogation centers not only at Guantanamo Bay but also in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and spent an enormous amount of money on defense and 
anti-terror measures:
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President Bush's defense budget request of $481.4 billion—an 11 
percent boost over last year—pushes U.S. defense spending to 
levels not seen since the Reagan-era buildup of the 1980s. In 
addition, the president is seeking a projected $141.7 billion in 
emergency supplemental funding for 2008 for the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and for broader anti-terrorism efforts—bringing 
the total spent in those arenas since 2001 to $661 billion, eclips-
ing in real terms the cost of the Vietnam War.29
To test the appropriateness of the instruments of the "war on terrorism" 
we only have to ask one simple question: Has the world become more 
secure? Obviously not. The Taliban recaptured parts of Afghanistan, Iraq 
turned into an open training and recruiting center for "offspring" terror-
ists, and—this is most fatal—we have to ascertain a growing willingness to 
engage in anti-Western terrorism.
Even so, the RAF failed with its concept to mobilize the mass of workers, 
the underlying strategy was right (from the viewpoint of the terrorist 
organization): to use the harsh and maybe excessive state reaction as evi-
dence for the legitimacy of its actions and a trigger for growing support 
and—in the case of the RAF—revolution. Unlike the RAF, several terrorist 
organizations are able to benefit from the vicious circle of violence and 
counter-violence. This is true for so differing organizations and groups 
like the ANC, FLN, Hizbollah30 or al-Qa’ida. Besides the differences, that 
cover motivations as well as aims, means and (il)legitimacy,31 they have in 
common that they gained and, in the cases of Hizbollah and al-Qa’ida, 
still gain broad support from the state reaction.
The same applies to the Islamic terrorism we currently perceive as the 
biggest threat. The 2006 Lebanon War ended with a political defeat of 
Israel,32 or, as Zaid Al-Ali expounds on opendemocracy.net "Hizbollah 
has already won."33 It succeeded in defending Lebanese territory and 
itself in spite of Israel's massive military efforts. However, most of all, 
Hizbollah won because Israel's attacks killed hundreds of civilians that 
not only increased public support for it but also helped Hizbollah recruit 
new fighters. Of importance here is not the question of which side legiti-
mately fought the war, but which side can use the emotional effects—the 
pictures of destruction and of dead bodies—for its purposes.34
A terrorist organization can gain broad support, whether the idea or ideol-
ogy it stands for (or it claims to stand for) responds to an important need 
the addressees have. The German workers felt no need to be liberated by 
the RAF from the "lodger of capitalism."35 But bin Ladin obviously 
responds to a—and this is really alarming—growing feeling of discrimina-
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tion in the Muslim world. A feeling that is inter alia fed by the Palestine 
conflict. Palestine is part of the collective consciousness of the Muslim 
world; part of it is propaganda, part is hypocrisy. That notwithstanding, 
the Palestinian conflict is proof of a biased international system: of a 
political disaster that left hundred of thousands of people stranded—
hopelessly and impecuniously, compliant victims to organizations that 
offer money and a better life—and has remained unsolved for decades.
A second example, that also circulates through the Muslim world as evi-
dence not only for a biased international order but as brutal discrimina-
tion of Muslims, is the UN sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, 
beginning in 1990 and continued until the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003. The sanctions were imposed on the regime following Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait, banning financial resources and all trade except for 
medicine36 and, in some circumstances, food. Under U.S. President 
Ronald Reagan, the sanctions were initially intended to bring about a 
change of system in Iraq, but later, under U.S. President Bill Clinton, only 
the complete disclosure of the Iraqi weapons program was settled for. The 
dimension of the humanitarian cataclysm is dubious to date. Estimates of 
direct casualties of the sanctions reach up to "One million Iraqis, mostly 
children."37 The sanctions made people suffer for a regime and its politics 
they were obviously not responsible for; Saddam's Iraq was a dictatorship 
characterized by the powerlessness of the subject. Second, the U.S. and 
Europe armed Saddam's regime, providing him with weapons and tech-
nology to fight the so-called mullah-regime in Iran.38
It is examples like this, together with references to current coercive mea-
sures, applied in the "war on terrorism," that enable Usama bin Ladin not 
only to justify al-Qa’ida's assaults, but also to construct the threat of West-
ern crusade against Islam as a whole. In an interview, recorded by al 
Jazeera on 20th October 2001, the second week of the U.S. attacks on 
Afghanistan, bin Ladin made connections between the sanctions on Iraq, 
the war in Afghanistan and a new crusade: "What about the people that 
have been killed in our lands for decades? More than 1,000,000 children 
died in Iraq, and they are still dying […] this is a war which, like previous 
wars, is reviving the Crusades."39
Containment Revived
We seriously have to take into consideration that Muslims all over the 
world are sharing a growing feeling of insecurity, of threat, of inferiority. 
To fight terrorism, we have to concentrate on helping people lose their 
insecurity and angst, and get back their self-esteem. Maybe that sounds a 
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little bit esoteric and as much inappropriate as possible to formulate con-
crete politics. But this was, as John Lewis Gaddis notes, the underlying 
notion of Kennan's strategy of containment:
More serious [than a Russian war to conquer Europe and Japan, 
A.B.] was the possibility of conquest by psychological means: the 
danger that the people of Western Europe and Japan […] might 
become so demoralized by the combined dislocations of war and 
reconstruction as to make themselves vulnerable, through sheer 
lack of self-confidence, to communist-led coups, or even to com-
munist victories in free elections.40
Communism enjoyed broad support after the Second World War, given 
that it was largely communists who organized the resistance against 
Hitler and Nazi-Germany.41 Similarly, Islam, i.e., its radical interpreta-
tion, is perceived as an answer and a solution: it creates a feeling of 
belonging, it is an explanation for the perceived felt discrimination, and it 
provides a justification for confrontation. The last point is decisive: radi-
cal Islam vitally needs the enmity of the Western World, no matter 
whether it is real or just propaganda; that exactly correlates with 
Kennan's assessment of Soviet communism. In his famous "Long 
Telegram," he analyzed that Soviet communism is dependent on the 
enmity of the Western World. It is a legitimation "for the dictatorship 
without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not 
dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand."42
Kennan's strategy of containment was based upon two pillars. First, 
European economic rehabilitation: "This would have the advantage…of 
removing or at least mitigating the conditions that had made indigenous 
communism popular there in the first place."43 And second, the convic-
tion that might does not make right, or, as Kennan told students at the 
Naval Academy in May 1947: "Our country has made the greatest effort in 
modern times…to treat questions of international life from the standpoint 
of principles and not of power."44 The former would help to restore self 
esteem of the European people, the latter to decrease mistrust and insecu-
rity: "The United States…must demonstrate by its own self-confidence 
and patience, but particularly by the integrity and dignity of its example, 
that the true glory of Russian national effort can find its expression only 
in peaceful and friendly association with other peoples and not in 
attempts to subjugate and dominate those peoples."45
Both pillars may serve as guidelines for anti-terrorism policies that 
endeavor to delve to the bottom of the problem, instead of dealing only 
with the symptoms. This strategy can only function in the long term. The 
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movie "Charlie Wilson's War" is a true depiction of U.S. support for the 
finally successful mujahidin resistance against Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. And so it ends, as Charles Wilson writes in the Washington 
Post, "congressional appropriators turn down my request for funds to 
rebuild Afghanistan's schools, roads and economy."46 For the rehabilita-
tion of a whole country, a million dollars was too much; however, not so 
one billion dollars for financing a war. Of course, the reality is not as sim-
ple as that: a stronger Western engagement in the buildup of Afghanistan 
would have avoided the rise of the Taliban. But, as the success of 
Hizbollah teaches us, gaps will be filled. And, yes, it makes a difference, 
whether I teach children in an open and free educational institution or in 
madrassas (religious schools), that are aimed at indoctrination. With a 
simple effect: once accepted social habits and socially embedded convic-
tions are very hard to question or change.
During the European economic rehabilitation, the U.S. focused on aid and 
not on arms, as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal explained:
At the present time we are keeping our military expenditures 
below the levels which our military leaders must in good con-
science estimate as the minimum which would in themselves 
ensure national security. By so doing we are able to increase our 
expenditures to assist in European recovery. In other words, we 
are taking a calculated risk in order to follow a course which 
offers a prospect of eventually achieving national security and 
also long-term world stability.47
In times of the "war on terrorism," the signs have changed and "America's 
civilian institutions of diplomacy and development continue to be chroni-
cally undermanned and underfunded. We spend 1 percent of the federal 
budget on these critical elements of our foreign policy, compared with 22 
percent on the military and weapons."48
This shift of emphasis leads to the second pillar: that might does not make 
right. Economic wealth, combined with social development, is a premise 
of a people's self-esteem; but it must be accompanied by an international 
environment that is not discriminating. Discrimination is a kind of social 
exclusion that causes the desire of belonging. And Islamic groups respond 
to this desire, intensifying the opposition: We versus Them.
In practical terms: our international order must become subject to princi-
ple, not power, i.e. that rules and norms are binding on every state, the 
weak as well as the mighty. The Hobbesian "might makes right" creates 
only insecurity, given firstly that power is never absolute, but always rela-
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tive. "For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to 
kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with 
others that are in the same danger with himself."49 Our world must 
become more just. As long as we have unsolved hot spots like the 
Palestine conflict, or a biased implementation of international treaties, as 
long as one part of the world can easily make an legal decision that costs 
thousands of innocent lives and as long as the place of birth determines 
one's lifespan and prospects,50 there will always be new supporters and 
followers for terrorists like Usama bin Ladin. We need to meet an 
American-European task: more economic development and an interna-
tional order that is ruled by principle, not by power.
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Endnotes 
1   Frey (2004), p. IX.
2   In the 1980's the U.S.A categorized the ANC as a terrorist organization; it took the 
U.S. Administration until June 2008 to delete Nelson Mandela from the State 
Department's terror watch list. I will return to the examples of the FNL and ANC in 
greater detail later.
3   Quoted in: Govier (2002), p. 94.
4   Hereafter I intend to withdraw my remarks on Kennan's understanding of contain-
ment, not on the concept that was implemented in the 1950s.
5   I do believe and hope, that men can learn from history and that governments are 
able and willing to act on lessons taught by history.
6   Kennan, George F., quoted by: Gaddis (1982), p. 35.
7   Kennan, quoted by Gaddis (1982), p. 51.
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8   As Gaddis notes, the strategy of containment was aimed at "the psychological mal-
aise in countries bordering on the Russian sphere of influence that made them, and 
hence the overall balance of power, vulnerable to Soviet expansive tendencies." 
(Gaddis (1982), p. 35)
9   The European Recovery Program, which is better known as the Marshall Plan, was 
originally intended for Europe as a whole, including parts of the USSR and Russia. 
Stalin, who initially showed some interest in joining the plan, refused in the end. 
And as a clear sign of Soviet power and influence, he forced Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, which intended to enlist the Marshall Plan, to reject U.S. aid. Stalin cor-
rectly realized that the Plan would decrease Soviet control of Eastern Europe and 
would make it easier for these countries to escape Soviet hegemony.
10   At this point we may already see the advantages Kennan's strategy has over a mili-
tary concept of rearmament and confrontation. The Marshall Plan was literally an 
open bid, excluding not Russia and not even Germany. Something that is impossi-
ble to say about any military strategy.
11   Roy, Olivier: "Britain: homegrown terror" 
(http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/05terror), accessed on 13th September 2008). 
The same is true for the so-called "Sauerland-terrorists," that planned a series of 
bombings against U.S.-citizens and U.S.-facilities in Germany in 2007. Two of the 
three suspected and arrested persons are German converts, the third is a Turkish 
Muslim. One of the German converts is considered by the investigators as the 
leader of the gang and founder of a German cell of the "Islamic Jihad Union."
12   In contrast to various authors like Michael Walzer, Noam Chomsky or Uwe 
Steinhoff, I understand terrorism to be decidedly anti-statist. Even though non-
statist groups and states can take recourse to the same means, that is: exercise ter-
ror. However, there is a crucial difference insofar, as we consider statist violence 
basically legitimate, even if it kills and hurts. In contrast to that, we principally con-
sider non-statist violence to be illegitimate. 
13   Cf. Waldmann (1998), p. 10.
14   Ibid., p. 10.
15   I perceive a religiously-motivated terrorism like the one practiced by al-Qa’ida as a 
sub-category of terrorism as such, given that the aim to implement an Islamic the-
ocracy is the same as the aim to implement a communistic order or to split a region 
as it all means a fundamental change to the present socio-political order.
16   Following the devastating bomb attacks on 11th March 2004 on several commuter 
trains in Madrid, the Spanish voters deselected the government of José Maria 
Assnar. Prime Minister Assnar was not only a close ally and strong supporter of the 
Iraq policy of U.S. President George W. Bush, he also blamed the Basque under-
ground organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) for the attacks so as to avoid a 
connection between the attacks and his Iraq policy. However, captured members of 
an al-Qa’ida cell soon confessed to the attacks, in which 191 people got killed and 
1,500 were hurt. The leader of the opposition and socialist José Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero went into the election campaign with the promise to withdraw the 
Spanish troops out of Iraq. On the 14th March Zapatero was elected Prime 
Minister; he immediately announced the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from 
Iraq.
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17   Cf. Narveson (1991), p. 119–120.
18   Ibid., p. 117.
19   Waldmann (1998), p. 12.
20   Ibid., p. 12–13.
21   Although we know an individual right of self-defense, a group based right of 
defense is heavily contested. The case of the ANC is exemplary: though it fought an 
obviously inhuman and discriminatory political system, the South African state 
could draw upon the basic assumptions of the UN-System, i.e. that states and not 
non-state groups, no matter what their aim may be, are the legitimate entities of 
the international system. Consequently, the U.S.A regarded the ANC as an illegiti-
mate terrorist group.
22   Just remember the support the Taliban regime offered Usama bin Ladin and his al-
Qa’ida: without such areas of retreat, that were safe, i.e. without real danger for bin 
Ladin to be turned over to the U.S.A, and hard to capture, like the mountain for-
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